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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
We are asked to review two or ders granting partial 
summary judgment to the defendant in this ERISA action. 
Review of one order requires us to interpret ERISA's statute 
of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty claims, 29 U.S.C. 
S 1113. Review of the other requir es us to determine 
whether the defendant fiduciary, if found to have made 
material misrepresentations to the plaintiffs, may be held 
accountable to those plaintiffs who relied to their detriment 
in making decisions other than decisions to r etire. 
 
I. 
 
The factual and procedural history of this case is 
extensive and has been recounted elsewher e in detail.1 We 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. See e.g., In re Unisys Corp., 57 F.3d 1255, 1257-61 (3d Cir. 1995), 
cert. 
denied sub nom, Unisys v. Pickering, 517 U.S. 1103 (1996); In re Unisys 
Corp., 957 F. Supp. 628, 631-32 (E.D. Pa. 1997); In re Unisys Corp., 837 
F. Supp. 670, 672 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aff 'd, 58 F.3d 896 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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will explain only the status of the case as it comes to us on 
this appeal. This is a class action filed on behalf of retirees 
and disabled former employees of the Sperry, Burroughs, 
and Unisys Corporations ("retirees" or "plaintiffs") against 
Unisys Corporation ("Unisys"). The dispute arises out of 
Unisys' termination of its post-retir ement medical plans for 
retirees and disabled former employees of the three 
companies. 
 
On November 3, 1992, Unisys announced that it would 
terminate all of its preexisting medical benefit plans and 
replace them with a new one effective January 1, 1993.2 
Under the majority of the old plans, Unisys paid the entire 
medical premium for the lives of the retir ees and provided 
continuing benefits for their spouses. The new plan, in 
contrast, required the retirees to contribute escalating 
amounts to the cost of the premiums until January 1, 
1995, at which time the retirees would become responsible 
for the entire premium. 
 
Upon learning about this planned change in r etirement 
benefits, retirees of Sperry, Burr oughs, and Unisys 
separately filed eight different lawsuits against Unisys in 
four jurisdictions. See In re Unisys Corp., 837 F. Supp. 670, 
672 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (citing cases). These lawsuits were 
eventually consolidated. The retirees asserted three causes 
of action: breach of contract, estoppel, and br each of 
fiduciary duty. 
 
The District Court granted summary judgment to Unisys 
on the breach of contract claims of the Burr oughs and 
Unisys retirees, as well as on the estoppel and breach of 
fiduciary duty claims of all plaintiffs. See In re Unisys Corp., 
837 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. Pa. 1993). After a non-jury trial, the 
District Court granted judgment to Unisys on the contract 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In September 1986, Sperry Corporation and Burr oughs Corporation 
merged to form Unisys Corporation. Following the merger, Unisys 
maintained the preexisting medical benefit plans of its component 
corporations until 1989. That year, Unisys cr eated its own Post- 
Retirement and Extended Disability Medical Plan to cover employees who 
retired after April 1, 1989, most of whom were former Sperry and 
Burroughs employees. Even with the addition of the new plan, however, 
Unisys kept its predecessor plans intact. 
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claims of the Sperry retirees. See In re Unisys Corp., 1994 
WL 284079 (E.D. Pa.). 
 
During the trial, Unisys relied upon the fact that the 
applicable ERISA plans and summary plan descriptions 
("SPDs") contained a reservation of rights clause, reserving 
to Unisys the right to amend or terminate the plan at any 
time for any reason. The Sperry retir ees advanced two 
theories in response. The first was that, when the 
applicable ERISA plans and summary plan descriptions 
described the health care benefits as "lifetime" benefits, this 
was intended to convey not only that the existing plan 
provided such benefits for life but also that those benefits 
were vested, i.e., guaranteed against change. The second 
theory "was that although the SPDs used lifetime language 
to describe the benefits of [both] actives and retirees, Sperry 
had an unwritten `practice' or `policy' that once an 
individual retired, his/her benefits`locked in.' Pursuant to 
this `lock in' policy, the company could not r educe the 
medical benefits of retirees under any circumstances." In re 
Unisys Corp., 1994 WL 284079 at *23. 
 
At the seven day trial, the District Court admitted and 
considered extrinsic evidence tendered to show Unisys' 
intent in promulgating the plans. The Court concluded that 
"lifetime benefits" as used in the plans and SPDs did not 
reflect an intent to create "vested" lifetime benefits, 
observing that "the plaintiffs conceded thr oughout the 
entire trial that an active employee's benefits could always 
be awarded or terminated even though lifetime language 
was similarly used to describe that benefit . . . implicitly 
recogniz[ing] that lifetime is not synonymous with vested." 
Id. at *22. With respect to the plaintiffs' second theory, the 
District Court found no evidence of a corporate practice or 
policy of "locking-in" benefits at r etirement, noting that "not 
a single document corroborat[ed] the testimony that an 
active/retiree distinction was in for ce." Id. at *23. 
 
The District Court's ultimate conclusion at the end of the 
trial was that the plaintiffs lacked any contract right to 
lifetime benefits. The evidence that it hear d and our 
intervening decision in Bixler v. Cent. Pa. T eamsters Health 
& Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292 (3d Cir. 1993), however, 
caused it to reconsider its summary judgment in Unisys' 
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favor on the Sperry plaintiffs' breach offiduciary duty 
claims. Ultimately, it reinstated those claims. 3 In the course 
of doing so, it pointed to evidence that (1) a "r etirement 
counselor [had] responded to questions about the 
reservation of rights clause raised by potential retirees by 
saying that the language `pertained to active employees and 
not to retirees' ", and (2) a "personnel manager . . . admitted 
to routinely telling inquiring employees that their post- 
retirement medical benefits were`guaranteed to them for 
life.' " The Court described this evidence as"just a small 
sample of the evidence on this issue." In r e Unisys Corp., 
1994 WL 284079 at *34 n.69. The Court also r eferenced 
evidence indicating "the highest levels of corporate 
management at Sperry, and later Unisys, recognized that 
employees might be under the mistaken belief that`lifetime' 
meant forever." Id. at *26. The Court explained its 
reinstatement decision by stating "that based on [this] 
evidence and the law in this circuit, it seems possible that 
at least some plaintiffs will be able to sustain a [breach of 
fiduciary duty] claim." Id. at *27. 4 The Court declined, 
however, to reinstate the estoppel claims. 
 
An interlocutory appeal followed, bringing befor e us the 
judgments in Unisys' favor on the contract and estoppel 
claims and the decision to reinstate the br each of fiduciary 
duty claims. We found judgment appropriate on the breach 
of contract claim because the plans and SPDs pr ovided 
unambiguous notice that lifetime medical benefits were not 
guaranteed, even for those who retired when the plans still 
provided for such benefits. On the unambiguous face of the 
plans, there was no right to lifetime medical benefits and 
extrinsic evidence should not be considered. See In re 
Unisys Corp. ("Unisys I"), 58 F .3d 896, 904-06 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
 
We found that summary judgment was appr opriate on 
the retirees' estoppel claim as well: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. After we affirmed this decision, the District Court reinstated the 
similar claims of the Burroughs and Unisys r etirees as well. In re Unisys 
Corp., 1996 WL 455968 (E.D. Pa.). 
 
4. At the same time, the Court stressed that the breach of fiduciary duty 
claim was not before it and that it was "not holding that a breach did in 
fact occur." Id. at *27. 
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       Due to the unambiguous reservation of rights clauses 
       in the summary plan descriptions by which Unisys 
       could terminate its retiree medical benefit plans, the 
       regular retirees cannot establish"reasonable" 
       detrimental reliance based on an interpr etation that 
       the SPDs promised vested benefits. The r etirees' 
       interpretation of the plans as providing lifetime benefits 
       is not reasonable as a matter of law because it cannot 
       be reconciled with the unqualified reservation of rights 
       clauses in the plans. 
 
Unisys I, 58 F.3d at 907. 
 
In a separate opinion, we also upheld the District Court's 
reinstatement decision. See In re Unisys Corp. ("Unisys II"), 
57 F.3d 1255 (3d Cir. 1995). W e did so because the record 
suggested that some retirees might be able to show one or 
both of the following: (1) Unisys representatives counseled 
them that they had lifetime medical benefits without 
making reference to the reservation of rights clause, even 
though the representatives were awar e that many 
employees mistakenly understood such counsel to mean 
that such benefits became vested at the time of r etirement, 
see id. at 1260-61; and (2) Unisys repr esentatives 
"affirmatively represent[ed] to them that their medical 
benefits were guaranteed once they retir ed, when the 
company knew in fact this was not true." Id.  at 1266-67. 
We held that such conduct could constitute a breach of 
Unisys' fiduciary duty as plan administrator . 
 
After the breach of fiduciary duty claim was reinstated for 
all classes of plaintiffs, Unisys filed two motions for partial 
summary judgment. At the same time, the Sperry r etirees 
submitted a motion for summary judgment on their claims. 
In its first motion, Unisys asked the District Court to grant 
it summary judgment against all Sperry retir ees who retired 
before November 17, 1986 (six years befor e the first 
complaint by Sperry retirees was filed), and against all 
Burroughs retirees who retir ed before December 3, 1986 
(six years before the first complaint by Burr oughs retirees 
was filed). Unisys argued that these plaintiffs were barred 
from having their claims heard by ERISA's statute of 
limitations, 29 U.S.C. S 1113. 
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In its second motion, Unisys sought to have the District 
Court grant summary judgment against all the plaintiffs 
who would not be able to prove that Unisys' alleged breach 
of fiduciary duty led them to retire earlier than they 
otherwise would have (e.g., retirees who did not voluntarily 
retire). It argued that the only legally cognizable harm that 
could have resulted from its alleged misr epresentations was 
acceleration in individual decisions to retir e. Other 
decisions made by the plaintiffs in reliance on Unisys' 
misrepresentations, Unisys contended, should not be 
considered a "resulting harm" of the alleged breach of 
fiduciary duty. 
 
In support of their summary judgment motion, the 
Sperry retirees argued that ther e is no material dispute of 
fact as to any of the elements of their breach of fiduciary 
duty claims. Accordingly, they urged the District Court to 
grant them judgment as a matter of law. 
 
The District Court granted Unisys' motions for partial 
summary judgment and denied summary judgment to the 
Sperry retirees on their motion. Those r etirees whose claims 
were extinguished by the partial summary judgments in 
Unisys' favor then successfully moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
54(b) for the entry of a final judgment on their claims so 
they could prosecute this appeal. See In r e Unisys Corp., 
189 F.R.D. 149 (E.D. Pa. 1999). 
 
II. 
 
Section 1113 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. S 1113 states, in its 
entirety: 
 
       No action may be commenced under this subchapter 
       with respect to a fiduciary's breach of any 
       responsibility, duty, or obligation under this part, or 
       with respect to a violation of this part, after the earlier 
       of 
 
       (1) six years after (A) the date of the last action which 
       constituted part of the breach or violation, or (B) in the 
       case of an omission, the latest date on which the 
       fiduciary could have cured the breach or violation, or 
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       (2) three years after the earliest date on which the 
       plaintiff had actual knowledge of the br each or 
       violation; 
 
       except that in the case of fraud or concealment, such 
       actions may be commenced not later than six years 
       after the date of discovery of such breach or violation. 
 
29 U.S.C. S 1113. 
 
The retirees argue that the District Court misapplied 
S 1113 in two respects. First, they ar gue that the Court 
erred in refusing to hold that under the"fraud or 
concealment" provision, the limitations period did not end 
until six years after they discovered the truth about their 
health care benefits. In the alternative, the retirees argue 
that even if we find the "fraud or concealment" provision 
inapplicable here, their claims are nevertheless timely 
under the six-year provision provided inS 1113(1)(A), which 
does not begin to run until "the date of the last action 
which constituted a part of the breach or violation." The 
retirees contend that the date of the last action constituting 
part of the breach in this case was the date on which 
Unisys terminated the old benefit plans. 
 
A. "Fraud or Concealment" 
 
The purpose of the "fraud or concealment" pr ovision is to 
codify a portion of the common law for ERISA br each of 
fiduciary duty claims. The issue raised by this pr ovision is 
not simply whether the alleged breach involved some kind 
of fraud but rather whether the fiduciary took steps to hide 
its breach so that the statute should not begin to run until 
the breach is discovered. As we explained in Kurz v. 
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 96 F.3d 1544 (3d Cir. 1996): 
 
       We now join our sister courts and hold thatS [1113]'s 
       "fraud and [sic] concealment" language applies the 
       federal common law discovery rule to ERISA br each of 
       fiduciary duty claims. In other words, when a lawsuit 
       has been delayed because the defendant itself has 
       taken steps to hide its breach of fiduciary duty, . . . the 
       limitations period will run six years after the date of 
       the claim's discovery. The relevant question is therefore 
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       not whether the complaint "sounds in concealment," 
       but rather whether there is evidence that the defendant 
       took affirmative steps to hide its br each of fiduciary 
       duty. 
 
Id. at 1552. 
 
In Kurz, the alleged breach of fiduciary duty was the 
counseling of employees considering retir ement about their 
retirement benefits without revealing that plan 
amendments to increase those benefits wer e under serious 
consideration. Because the "wrong . . . was neither self- 
concealing nor actively concealed," we expr essly reserved 
the issue, elsewhere debated, of "whetherS [1113]'s six year 
period extends to both `self-concealing' wr ongs as well as 
`active concealment' separate from the underlying 
wrongdoing." Id. at 1552. In this context, "a self-concealing 
act is an act committed during the course of the original 
fraud that has the effect of concealing the fraud from its 
victims, [while a]ctive concealment refers to acts intended 
to conceal the original fraud that are distinct from the 
original fraud." Wolin v. Smith Bar ney, Inc., 83 F.3d 847, 
852 (7th Cir. 1996). We held in Kurz that, regardless of 
whether the acts to conceal the breach occur in the course 
of the conduct that constitutes the underlying br each or 
independent of and subsequent to the breach, there must 
be conduct beyond the breach itself that has the effect of 
concealing the breach from its victims. 
 
Here, as in Kurz, the issue is "not whether the complaint 
`sounds in concealment' [i.e., not whether Unisys 
misadvised the retirees or counseled them without drawing 
attention to the reservation of rights clause], but rather 
whether there is evidence that the defendant took 
affirmative steps [at any point] to hide its breach of 
fiduciary duty." Id. at 1552 (emphasis added). Accordingly, 
if all that a plaintiff can show is that a counselor 
represented to him that he had guaranteed lifetime health 
care benefits or failed to give him accurate advice knowing 
that he believed he had such benefits, the fraud or 
concealment clause is inapplicable. In such cases, Unisys 
cannot be said to have taken affirmative steps, either as a 
part of the original breach of duty or ther eafter, to cover up 
its breach. To the contrary, pursuant to the relevant 
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provisions of ERISA, Unisys regularly distributed to its 
employees and retirees SPDs unambiguously explaining 
that the plan provisions calling for lifetime benefits could be 
amended at any time for any reason. As the District Court 
aptly put it, 
 
       While . . . compliance with SPD disclosure obligations 
       does not relieve a company of its fiduciary duty to 
       avoid confusing participants about their benefits, this 
       court will not hold that the truth about the "lifetime" 
       benefits was concealed from participants when the 
       information about the reservation of rights clause was 
       unambiguously printed and distributed [by the 
       company] in the SPD. 
 
In re Unisys Corp., 957 F. Supp. at 635. Accordingly, we 
hold that the "fraud or concealment" pr ovision of S 1113(2) 
is inapplicable to such cases.5 
 
It is true, as retirees stress, that the doctrine of equitable 
tolling can under some circumstances pr event a limitations 
period from running in favor of a trustee on a breach of 
fiduciary duty claim even in the absence of concealment on 
his part. Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall 342 (1875), upon which 
plaintiffs heavily rely, provides one example of such 
circumstances. We conclude, however , that superimposing 
such equitable tolling rules on the statutory limitations 
scheme set forth in S 1113 would be inconsistent with 
congressional intent and the clear teachings of the 
Supreme Court. 
 
In Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigr ow v. Gilbertson, 
501 U.S. 350, 360-62 (1991), the Court held that Rule 
10(b)(5) misrepresentation claims ar e governed by S 9(e) and 
S 18(c) of the Securities and Exchange Act, each of which 
requires that suit be filed befor e the earlier of (a) one year 
from the discovery of the facts constituting the violation or 
(b) three years from "the violation" (or, in the case of S 18(c), 
from the date "the cause of action accrued"). The plaintiff 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Notwithstanding plaintiffs' argument to the contrary, we do not regard 
the fact that the alleged misrepresentations were repeated (as opposed to 
isolated) as satisfying the requirement that there be affirmative steps to 
conceal beyond the misrepresentations themselves. 
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there argued that the doctrine of equitable tolling should 
apply so that the three-year limitations period would not 
start to run until the fraud was discovered even where no 
steps where taken by the defendant to conceal the fraud. 
The Court rejected that argument, finding it fundamentally 
at odds with the legislative scheme: 
 
       Plaintiff-respondents note, correctly, that "[t]ime 
       requirements in lawsuits . . . are customarily subject to 
       `equitable tolling.' " Irwin v. Department of Veterans 
       Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990), citing Hallstrom v. 
       Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 27 (1989). Thus, this 
       Court has said that in the usual case, "wher e the party 
       injured by the fraud remains in ignorance of it without 
       any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the 
       bar of the statute does not begin to run until the fraud 
       is discovered, though there be no special 
       circumstances or efforts on the part of the party 
       committing the fraud to conceal it from the knowledge 
       of the other party." Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall. 342, 348 
       (1875); see also Holmberg v. Armbr echt, 327 U.S. 392, 
       396-397 (1946). Notwithstanding this venerable 
       principle, it is evident that the equitable tolling 
       doctrine is fundamentally inconsistent with the 1-and- 
       3-year structure. 
 
        The 1-year period, by its terms, begins after 
       discovery of the facts constituting the violation, making 
       tolling unnecessary. The 3-year limit is a period of 
       repose inconsistent with tolling. One commentator 
       explains: "[T]he inclusion of the thr ee-year period can 
       have no significance in this context other than to 
       impose an outside limit." . . . Because the purpose of 
       the 3-year limitation is clearly to serve as a cutof f, we 
       hold that tolling principles do not apply to that period. 
 
Id. at 363. 
 
Although the specified duration of the limitations periods 
here is different, the legislative scheme is the same. 
Congress has determined that the cut-of f date should be 
the earlier of (a) three years from the date of discovery of 
the claim and (b) six years from the violation. The only 
difference is that ERISA's statute makes a single express 
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exception for cases of "fraud or concealment." Just as in 
Lampf, it would be fundamentally inconsistent with the 
statutory scheme here to accept the argument that the six- 
year period does not begin to run until discovery of the 
fraud, where the defendant has engaged in no wr ongful 
activity beyond the original fraud on which the plaintiffs' 
claims are based. Indeed, given the fact that Congress 
provided one express exception in S 1113(2), rejection of 
equitable tolling here follows a fortiori  from the Supreme 
Court's holding in Lampf. 
 
Similarly, we must decline plaintiffs' invitation to apply 
their equitable tolling principles under the guise of 
construing S 1113(2)'s "fraud or concealment" provision. 
Accepting that invitation would require us to reject Kurz, 
and we are bound by that precedent. Contrary to plaintiffs' 
suggestion, we do not read our subsequent case law as 
diluting the significance of Kurz in the context of this case.6 
 
This does not end the matter, however . Unlike the District 
Court, we are unwilling to say based on the current record 
that no retiree will be able to successfully invoke the "fraud 
or concealment" provision of S 1113(2). As we have noted, 
the District Court, when deciding to reinstate the breach of 
fiduciary duty claims, pointed to evidence suggesting that a 
"retirement counselor [had] r esponded to questions about 
the reservation of rights clause raised by potential retirees 
by saying that the language pertained to active employees 
and not to retirees." In re Unisys Corp., 1994 WL 284079 at 
*34 n.69. It seems to us entirely possible that advice of this 
character might well bring the fraud or concealment 
provision into play. If, for example, advice about the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In particular, plaintiffs point to this Court's decision in Adams v. 
Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475 (3d Cir. 2000). As we expressly 
noted, no statute of limitations issue was befor e us in that appeal. 
Although a footnote in that case makes refer ence to "issues left 
unresolved in Kurz about the anatomy and scope of the fraudulent 
concealment doctrine," i.e., whether ERISA's statute of limitations 
applies to "self-concealing" as well as "active concealment" cases, id. at 
494 n.5 (full citations and internal quotations omitted), we do not read 
Adams as purporting to second guess the Kurz  rule that the "fraud or 
concealment" provision requires"affirmative steps to hide [the] breach of 
fiduciary duty." Kurz, 96 F.3d at 1552. 
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reservation of rights clause was given under circumstances 
such that an employee, who had consulted the SPD, was 
dissuaded from consulting counsel regar ding that clause, 
we believe that the advice could appropriately be regarded 
as an affirmative step having the ef fect of concealing 
Unisys' breach. 
 
It would be inappropriate for us to decide at this stage 
whether "fraud or concealment" within the meaning of 
section 1113(2) has occurred in this case. W e hold only 
that, drawing all permissible inferences against the party 
seeking summary judgment, there may be r etirees who will 
be able to prove that Unisys counselors concealed their 
breach from them and that the limitation period did not 
foreclose suit until six years after the date they discovered 
the breach had occurred. 
 
B. "Date of the last action which constituted 
part of the breach" 
 
Having concluded that the six-year limitations period is 
applicable to plaintiffs' claims, we must determine when 
that period began to run, i.e., "the date of the last action 
which constituted a part of the breach." Unisys insists that 
this text focuses on the last action of the fiduciary which 
was in violation of its fiduciary duty. While it does not 
maintain that the current record pinpoints the date upon 
which the last alleged misrepresentation was made, it 
correctly points out that insofar as decisions to retire are 
concerned, a retiree's date of r etirement is necessarily the 
last date upon which Unisys could have made a r elevant 
misrepresentation or upon which a clarifying 
communication could have prevented detrimental reliance. 
Unisys therefore asks us to affir m the District Court's grant 
of summary judgment against those members of the 
plaintiffs' class who retired mor e than six years before the 
date on which their case was originally filed, in 1992. 
 
The retirees, on the other hand, contend that the date of 
the last action which constituted part of the br each was 
November 3, 1992, the date on which Unisys announced 
the termination of its "lifetime" plans. They argue that 
S 1113 must be interpreted in this manner because no 
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actual harm occurred and thus no legitimate claim of 
breach of fiduciary duty arose until Unisys terminated the 
plans that it initially had misrepresented. Even though the 
retirees concede that the termination of the old plans was 
a non-fiduciary act, they nevertheless insist that a non- 
fiduciary act can constitute "part of the br each or violation" 
of fiduciary duty if it is the final act that gives rise to a 
cause of action. 
 
In Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475 (3d Cir. 
2000), this Court recently reviewed the elements of a 
breach of fiduciary duty claim like that of the plaintiffs 
here. We found the controlling pr ecepts in our prior 
decision in this case: 
 
        An employee may recover for a breach of fiduciary 
       duty if he or she proves that an employer , acting as a 
       fiduciary, made a material misrepresentation that 
       would confuse a reasonable beneficiary about his or 
       her benefits, and the beneficiary acted ther eupon to his 
       or her detriment. 
 
Id. at 492, citing Unisys II, 57 F .3d at 1264. 
 
Given these elements of a claim for breach offiduciary 
duty in this context, it necessarily follows that any breach 
that may have occurred was completed, and a claim based 
thereon accrued, no later than the date upon which the 
employee relied to his detriment on the misr epresentations. 
Surely, any employee who sought counsel and who took 
early retirement based on Unisys' expr ess assurance that 
she possessed guaranteed lifetime health car e, thereby 
reducing the amount of pension she would otherwise 
receive, could bring suit immediately and secur e rescission 
of her retirement or some other appr opriate equitable relief.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The dissenting opinion assumes that an employee misled by Unisys 
about guaranteed life care benefits would be entitled to a remedy taking 
into account his or her expectancy interest in such benefits rather than, 
or perhaps in addition to, the economic loss suffered when he changed 
position in detrimental reliance on Unisys' conduct. The District Court 
has not yet addressed what remedies may be available to a retiree who 
establishes a breach of fiduciary duty, and we, of course, express no 
opinion on the availability of expectancy compensation or any other form 
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Accordingly, it seems clear to us that the six-year period for 
such plaintiffs commenced no later than the r espective 
dates of their retirements.8  
 
We therefore agree with the District Court that the denial 
of free health care coverage was not an element of the 
plaintiffs' claim. As the District Court pointed out, the 
alleged breach of fiduciary duty here concerned the counsel 
allegedly given or not given, and there is no causal nexus 
between that counsel and the denial of free health care 
coverage. In re Unisys Corp., 957 F . Supp. at 639. If Unisys 
had provided clear and accurate counsel, some r etirements 
may not have occurred when they did, but ther e is no 
reason to believe retirees would now have free coverage. As 
the District Court held, Unisys had a right to ter minate free 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
of relief. We do note, however, that there is a material difference 
between 
the value of a health care plan with guaranteed lifetime benefits and the 
value of a health care plan with benefits that can be canceled at any 
time for any reason. Accordingly, if an employee were entitled to an 
expectancy remedy as a result of r etiring after being told he had the 
former, when in fact he had the latter , he would be entitled to bring 
suit 
immediately for the difference between the value he was promised and 
the value he received or for specific per formance of the promise to 
provide a plan or policy with guaranteed lifetime health care. The dissent 
is correct, however, that a retir ee who chose not to bring a suit for 
guaranteed lifetime benefits or the value ther eof, and who died before 
any change in the plan, would serendipitously have wound up in the 
same position he would have been in had the misr epresentation been 
true. Accordingly, his estate would have no claim based on lost health 
care benefits. 
 
8. If the "date of the last action which constitutes a part of the breach" 
is the date of Unisys' last misrepresentation, it is theoretically 
possible 
that the statute could begin to run before a r etiree could seek relief 
from 
a court since detrimental reliance is a necessary element of a breach of 
fiduciary duty of this kind. We need not decide, however, whether the six 
year period can begin to run before a br each of fiduciary duty claim 
accrues. As we have noted, the District Court and the parties have 
regarded the date of the last relevant misrepresentations and the date of 
detrimental reliance as being the same date and the only issue briefed 
is whether that date or the date of the denial of fr ee health care 
coverage 
is the legally relevant date. Accordingly, we hold only that the statute 
began to run no later than the date of alleged detrimental reliance. 
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health care coverage, and it exercised that right in a non- 
fiduciary capacity. Id. at 638.9  
 
It is not clear to us, however, that the claims of all Sperry 
retirees who retired befor e November 17, 1986, and all 
Burroughs retirees who retir ed before December 3, 1986, 
are barred. While the primary theory of liability being 
asserted here is clearly that many relied on the 
misrepresentations to their detriment by deciding to take 
voluntary retirement, as we explain her eafter, Unisys has 
not persuaded us that this is the only viable theory of 
liability. It may well be that retirees who retired before 
those dates relied to their detriment in making other 
decisions after those dates. Accordingly, the summary 
judgment entered by the District Court was overbroad and 
must be reversed. Summary judgment for Unisys would be 
appropriate, however, with respect to those who assert 
claims based solely on retirement decisions made more 
than six years before suit was filed. 
 
III. 
 
Unisys argues that an essential element of the breach of 
fiduciary duty claim recognized in our prior opinion is a 
voluntary decision to retire made in r eliance on a mistaken 
view that health care benefits were guaranteed for life. It 
necessarily follows, according to Unisys, that it is entitled 
to summary judgment with respect to anyone who was 
mandatorily retired at age 65, left the company's employ 
involuntarily because of disability, or for some other reason 
made no such decision. 
 
In response, the plaintiffs insist that the category of 
claims we earlier recognized is not limited to claims based 
on retirement decisions and have submitted affidavits from 
members of the class who allege that, in reliance on their 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. It is only fortuitous that the fiduciary who did the alleged counseling 
here was the employer who exercised its right to change the plans. If 
Unisys had not been the administrator of the plans and an independent 
administrator had breached its fiduciary duty by miscounseling retirees, 
it would be even more clear that the plan admendments were not "the 
last action which constituted a part of the br each." 
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belief that they had guaranteed lifetime benefits, they 
declined other employment opportunities, chose to forego 
the opportunity to purchase supplemental health 
insurance, or made other important financial decisions for 
their retirement. 
 
The District Court agreed with Unisys and granted 
summary judgment against all who would be unable to 
prove a voluntary decision to retir e. We perceive no 
principled basis, however, for so cabining our holding in 
Unisys II. After all, in Bixler, upon which we heavily relied 
there, the decision resulting from the breach of fiduciary 
duty was a decision on whether to purchase COBRA 
insurance rather than a decision regarding retirement. See 
Bixler, 12 F.3d at 1301-03; see also Curcio v. John Hancock 
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 226, 237-39 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(fiduciary's misrepresentations about a new life insurance 
plan caused plaintiff to fail to obtain adequate coverage). It 
is, of course, not clear that the plaintiffs who rely upon 
these affidavits will be able to establish their entitlement to 
relief, but we decline Unisys' invitation to adopt an across 
the board prohibition of relief based upon reasonable 
reliance in contexts other than retir ement decisions. 
 
Understanding the import of our decision in Unisys II 
requires a recognition of the pr ocedural posture in which 
that appeal arose. As we have noted, the District Court 
initially granted summary judgment to Unisys on the 
breach of fiduciary duty claim. See In r e Unisys Corp., 837 
F. Supp. at 679-80. It was only after the trial and our 
decision in Bixler that it decided to r einstate that claim. See 
In re Unisys Corp., 1994 WL 284079 at *25-27. It was the 
propriety of that decision to reinstate, and only the 
propriety of that decision, that was befor e us as a certified 
issue in that interlocutory appeal. We held that 
reinstatement was appropriate and r emanded "for further 
proceedings."10 Unisys II, 57 F.3d at 1269. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. At times, the plaintiffs appear to r ead our opinion as, in effect, 
directing the entry of summary judgment in their favor on at least the 
voluntary decision to retire claims. W e do not so read the opinion, and 
the District Court did not so read it. At that point, Unisys had been 
provided with no opportunity to build a trial or summary judgment 
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It is true, as Unisys stresses, that our opinion addressed 
the issue for decision in the context of the plaintiffs having 
relied to their detriment in making decisions to retire. That 
was our focus because that was the plaintiffs' primary 
contention, and the absence of any refer ence to other kinds 
of reliance can hardly be taken as a ruling that other forms 
of reliance could not provide a valid basis for relief. We 
therefore reject the District Court's view that Unisys II, as 
a matter of law, limits recovery on the br each of fiduciary 
duty claims to claims based on voluntary decisions to 
retire. Moreover, we have found no other precedent 
supporting that position. 
 
The District Court expressed two related concerns in the 
course of granting summary judgment to Unisys on the 
claims not based on voluntary retirement decisions: a 
concern about opening Unisys to unjustifiably broad relief 
and a concern about inconsistency with this Court's 
disposition of the estoppel claims. It expressed those 
concerns as follows: 
 
        In allowing the breach of fiduciary claims to go 
       forward, this court and the Court of Appeals for the 
       Third Circuit have essentially held that r eliance by the 
       employees on the misrepresentations of Unisys, while 
       not "reasonable reliance" for purposes of a claim of 
       equitable estoppel, can still support a claim for br each 
       of fiduciary duty. In a sense, the rulings in this case 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
record in opposition to Bixler claims, and any ruling on the merits of 
those claims would have been inappropriate. On remand, the District 
Court noted that the breach of fiduciary duty claims had not been before 
it during the trial on the contract and estoppel claims and that, when 
reinstating those claims, it had made no deter mination that any plaintiff 
had proven his breach of fiduciary duty claim. On the contrary, the 
District Court on remand quoted the following observations it had made 
at the time of reinstatement: 
 
       [B]ecause some plaintiffs have str onger cases than others based on 
       their specific inquiries and the information given to them 
personally, 
       the court finds that subclasses, and possibly even individual 
       hearings, will be necessary to adjudicate these claims. 
 
In re Unisys Corp., 957 F. Supp. at 645. 
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       excuse the plan participants from their failur e to read 
       their summary plan documents in the limited context 
       of making the retirement decision: because of the 
       breach of duty, the employees may have r etired earlier 
       than they otherwise would have, and even if their 
       reliance on the misrepresentations was not reasonable, 
       the reliance supports a breach of fiduciary duty claim 
       because it was at least partially the fault of Unisys. 
 
        The "unreasonable" reliance excused here is narrow, 
       and supports a breach of fiduciary duty claim only in 
       certain limited circumstances--in this case, where the 
       employees retired earlier than they might have had 
       they not been misled by the lifetime 
       misrepresentations. This court believes that expanding 
       the concept of "resulting harm" in this case to the 
       types of reliance alleged in the retir ees' affidavits would 
       create an unjustified expansion of the narr ow holdings 
       of this court, and would by indirection r einstate the 
       claims for equitable estoppel. 
 
In re Unisys Corp., 957 F. Supp. at 644. 
 
The District Court's characterization of our decision in 
Unisys II as excusing "unreasonable r eliance" is 
inappropriate. We did not there hold that the existence of 
the SPD was irrelevant to the analysis of the breach of 
fiduciary duty claims. An employer, even when acting in a 
fiduciary capacity, is not responsible for harm that is not 
reasonably foreseeable. As we pointed out in our prior 
opinion in this case and in Adams, in or der for relief to be 
afforded, the conduct of the fiduciary must be such as to 
create a "substantial likelihood that it would mislead a 
reasonable employee in making [a decision to change his or 
her position]." Unisys II, 57 F .3d at 1264. Any 
determination of whether Unisys conveyed a message that 
was "materially misleading" in this sense cannot simply 
ignore the existence of the SPD. Rather , what we held on 
this score in Unisys II was as follows: (1) that the SPD did 
not as a matter of law satisfy Unisys' fiduciary 
responsibility; and (2) that there was evidence from which 
a trier of fact could conclude that Unisys should have 
foreseen that its conduct with respect to at least some of 
the class would cause reasonable employees to r ely to their 
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detriment, despite the existence of the SPD. Whether that is 
the case depends, of course, on the content of the message 
conveyed and the context in which it was conveyed. 
 
We did recognize in Unisys II that there are situations in 
which a fiduciary can reasonably foresee unreasonable 
reliance and, accordingly, be held accountable. Bixler, 12 
F.3d 1292 (3d Cir. 1994), provides an example. Mrs. Bixler 
there acknowledged that she had received a notice from the 
fiduciary concerning a right to apply for COBRA health care 
insurance, but she mistakenly believed that she and her 
husband were not eligible to do so because he was already 
hospitalized. Shortly after Mr. Bixler's death but still well 
within the period when she could have elected to secure 
COBRA coverage, Mrs. Bixler called the fiduciary's 
representative to inquire about a death benefit. The 
fiduciary accurately informed her that ther e was no death 
benefit but failed to advise her that she could r eceive 
reimbursement for her husband's considerable hospital 
expenses by signing and returning the COBRA notice the 
fiduciary had sent to her husband. We concluded that there 
was evidence from which a trier of fact could infer that the 
fiduciary was aware of the Bixlers' cir cumstances and of 
Mrs. Bixler's mistaken belief about the unavailability of 
COBRA insurance. See id. at 1302-03. In these 
circumstances, we held that the trier of fact could find a 
breach of fiduciary duty, and we did so without inquiring 
whether Mrs. Bixler's understanding of the COBRA notice 
was reasonable or unreasonable. 
 
Our decision in Bixler is based on a fiduciary's duty to 
deal fairly with its beneficiary and, more specifically, "to 
communicate to the beneficiary material facts af fecting the 
interest of the beneficiary which he knows the beneficiary 
does not know and which the beneficiary needs to know for 
his protection." Bixler, 12 F .3d at 1300, quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, S 173, comment (d) (1959). 
As we noted in Unisys II, there is evidence here with respect 
to some employees from which a trier of fact could conclude 
that specific inquiries were made giving notice to Unisys 
representatives that the employees could be expected to 
make retirement decisions based on the mistaken belief 
that their health benefits were guaranteed for life. See 
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Unisys II, 57 F.3d at 1266. Under Bixler, in these 
situations, a duty to advise of the reservation of rights 
clause would arise, and the existence of the SPD would not 
be relevant. 
 
We also recognized in Unisys II that a duty to advise 
affirmatively of the reservation of rights clause might have 
arisen even in the absence of beneficiary-specific 
information concerning confusion or mistake. The evidence 
then of record, we suggested, could per mit a finding that 
Unisys had acquired knowledge of confusion so pervasive 
that a reasonable fiduciary would have done more than 
simply rely on its SPD. See id. We did not, however, require 
clairvoyance on the part of the fiduciary. The law requires 
only that a fiduciary deal fairly with his beneficiaries and, 
in doing so, that it "exercise such car e and skill as a man 
of ordinary prudence would exercise" in his own affairs. 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, S 174. 
 
A judgment remains to be made as to whether a 
reasonable fiduciary in Unisys' position would have 
foreseen that its conduct towards the various plaintiffs 
would result in important decision making on their part 
based on a mistaken belief that they possessed guaranteed 
lifetime benefits. In situations involving actual knowledge 
on the part of Unisys that an employee was about to rely on 
such a misunderstanding, we agree with the District Court 
that the existence of the SPD is irrelevant. In other 
situations, however, the fact that Unisys had distributed 
what purported to be an authoritative guide to benefits is 
one of the circumstances that must be consider ed in 
passing this judgment on its conduct. 
 
We do not believe holding Unisys to the kind of fair 
dealing standard we recognized in Unisys II will impose an 
unfair burden upon it even if it is held to that standard in 
the context of decisions other than voluntary r etirement. 
We stress, however, that the character of the decision made 
and reliance claimed will, of course, play an important role 
in determining the extent of Unisys' fiduciary duty and 
whether that duty was breached. We also note that the 
District Court has not yet addressed what equitable 
remedies may be available to members of the class. 
Common law damages are not recoverable under ERISA for 
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a breach of fiduciary duty, and this fact may also limit 
Unisys' exposure. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 
248 (1993). 
 
Our insistence on reasonable foreseeability as a 
prerequisite to legal responsibility on the breach of 
fiduciary duty claims is not inconsistent with our resolution 
of the plaintiffs' estoppel claims in Unisys I. As our earlier 
quotation above from our prior opinion demonstrates, those 
claims were predicated on an allegation that the plaintiffs 
had relied to their detriment on the text of the plan and 
SPD. See Slip at 25, supra. On that occasion, we 
summarized our holding as follows: 
 
       Because our decisions require that any detrimental 
       reliance on plan language also be "r easonable," our 
       finding that the [reservation of rights clauses] are 
       unambiguous undercuts the reasonableness of any 
       detrimental reliance by the retirees. Accordingly, we 
       hold that the district court did not err in concluding, 
       on summary judgment, that the retirees' estoppel claim 
       failed as a matter of law. 
 
Unisys I, 58 F.3d at 908. The claim here, however, is not 
that the retirees relied on the text of the plans or the SPDs, 
but rather that they relied on counseling which they 
received from Unisys representatives. 
 
IV. 
 
The District Court's order dated March 10, 1997, will be 
reversed and this matter will be remanded to the District 
Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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MANSMANN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part, and 
concurring in the result in part. 
 
I am pleased to join with my colleagues in Part III of the 
majority opinion, which recognizes that an ERISA fiduciary 
who has created confusion about rights under a benefit 
plan has an ongoing responsibility for har m stemming from 
beneficiaries' decisions attributable to that confusion. While 
I also agree with the holding in Part II of the majority 
opinion that summary judgment must be reversed, I am 
unable to subscribe to the reasoning of that Part II because 
it threatens to undercut a fiduciary's r esponsibility by 
allowing a safe harbor so long as the breachingfiduciary 
arranges to keep the beneficiaries in the dark for six years 
after they rely on his misrepresentations. I believe that the 
majority's analysis of the statute of limitations af fords too 
little protection for trusting workers by using an artificial 
notion of detriment to start the statutory period, by 
disregarding the fiduciary's ongoing obligation to correct 
known misunderstanding, and by effectively writing out of 
the statute the doctrine of tolling until discovery of a self- 
concealing wrong.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Part II of the majority opinion contemplates entry of summary 
judgment against retirees whose claims (i) are based solely on retirement 
decisions made more than six years befor e this action was filed, and (ii) 
were not concealed by Unisys's advice. It is not clear that any actual 
person's claim will meet these criteria, however . As the majority 
recognizes, retirees may rely on the presence of medical coverage in 
making many of life's decisions beyond the decision to retire. Most 
people probably take such vital backgroundfinancial circumstances into 
consideration, at least tacitly, in everything that they do. Moreover, as 
explained below, I believe that all of these participants and 
beneficiaries 
detrimentally relied on Unisys's ongoing impr oper omission to correct its 
misrepresentations in declining to sue before they ultimately brought 
this action. 
 
In light of the wide scope of Unisys's alleged concealment, and the 
potentially pervasive presence of acts of r eliance beyond the retirement 
decision, my disagreement with Part II of the majority's analysis may be 
no more than theoretical, as it may well be that no claims at issue are 
"based solely on retirement decisions", and that all claims fall within 
the 
saving provisions of Part IIA or Part III. 
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I. 
 
The applicable statute of limitations requir es that claims 
be brought within six years of the "date of the last action 
which constituted a part of the breach or violation." 29 
U.S.C. S 1113(1)(A). As the majority acknowledges, the "last 
action" necessary to make out the claims at issue is 
detrimental reliance. See Opinion at 15 (r eferring to 
material misrepresentation and detrimental reliance as 
elements) (quoting Adams v. Freedom For ge Corp., 204 F.3d 
475, 492 (3d Cir. 2000)). See also Unisys II, 57 F.3d at 
1265 (defining elements of claim for fiduciary breach as (1) 
proof of fiduciary status, (2) misrepr esentations, (3) 
company knowledge of confusion, and (4) resulting harm).2 
 
The majority reasons, essentially, that the br each of duty 
by Unisys was its misrepresentation of the plan's 
provisions, and the detriment or "resulting harm" to the 
participants was their retirement without the protection of 
a guarantee. See Opinion at 15-16. This ef fectively reads 
the element of harm or detriment out of the claim. 
Although the retirement decisions wer e made in reliance, 
such reliance did not become detrimental until Unisys 
announced termination of the promised post-retirement 
medical benefits. If the benefits had continued, there would 
have been no injury. Cf. Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 
296, 300 (1998) ("A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it 
rests upon `contingent future events that may not occur as 
anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.' ") (quoting 
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 
580-81 (1985)). Here, resulting har m was contingent on the 
company's future conduct. 
 
The majority argues that actual harm is not a necessary 
element of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. While that 
may be correct as a general proposition, it is incorrect as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We recently observed that construction of ERISA's six-year statute 
"implicates sophisticated questions about whether the statute begins to 
run at the date of the misrepresentations, the date of the plan 
amendment, or some other date". Adams, 204 F.3d at 494 n.19. As will 
appear, I believe it runs from the date of the detrimental amendment, 
while the majority believes it runs from "some other date" -- viz., the 
date of the last act undertaken in reliance on the misrepresentations. 
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applied to the subset of fiduciary claims pr edicated on 
detrimental reliance. "Actual harm" and "detriment" appear 
to be synonymous. To the extent that ther e may be a 
difference between legal detriment and actual harm, only 
the latter should start the clock running for the statute of 
limitations. The significance of harm in the limitations 
context is that it brings the existence of the claim home to 
the claimant so that he may reasonably be expected to act. 
This purpose is not well served by a technical notion of 
"detriment" that does not actually impact the claimant.3 
 
The majority illustrates its view of detriment by 
hypothesizing that an employee who "sought counsel" and 
took early retirement based on the company's assurance of 
lifetime health care could "surely" bring suit immediately 
and secure rescission of her retir ement or other appropriate 
equitable relief.4 Opinion at 15. However, the question of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Moreover, cases holding that it is not necessary to demonstrate harm 
to establish a breach of fiduciary duty do not stand for the proposition 
that harm, where present, is not part of the breach. See Adams, 204 
F.3d 475, 492 (3d Cir. 2000). Fiduciary conduct is measured in light of 
all the attendant circumstances. There is a qualitative difference between 
an act by a fiduciary which falls short of the standard imposed by law 
and an act that also injures cestui que trust. Consequently, even a "non- 
fiduciary" act by the company which imposes injury on a beneficiary left 
vulnerable by a prior fiduciary breach becomes "part of the breach," and 
worsens it character. Thus, the "last action" could consist in the 
imposition of harm where it is part of the fiduciary breach, even if it 
were not a required element. 
 
4. Although the question of remedy is not now before us, the majority's 
reference to rescission as an illustrative remedy is significant. As the 
majority recognizes in Part III, participants may rely on their 
misapprehension of the plan benefits in many ways beyond deciding to 
retire. Some of these acts of reliance -- those involving expenditures or 
commitments made in expectation of a strongerfinancial position -- 
would be difficult to rescind, and rescission would not make the 
participant whole. So in general the rescission remedy may be unwieldy 
and inadequate. This follows from the majority's unrealistic assumption 
that the decisions themselves constitute the detriment to be redressed; 
whereas, actually the harm to be r emedied is the unexpected withdrawal 
of promised benefits. 
 
If instead of assuming that the object of a suit is to undo the retiree's 
life decisions, we recognize that the paradigmatic remedy may be 
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what actual or prospective harm is sufficient to allow suit 
by one apprized of her rights is not before us. 5 To my view, 
a more apt hypothetical concerns whether the estate of a 
participant who died before the old plan was terminated, 
and so received the promised medical benefits for life, 
would nevertheless be able to sue for breach offiduciary 
duty because the promised benefits, though paid, had not 
been sufficiently assured by the written plan? Surely not. 
The claim would fail due to the absence of actual injury. 
Thus, while I am not prepared to say that a retiree may 
never bring suit prior to enactment of a thr eatened 
detrimental change, I do not believe that the statute of 
limitations requires her to bring a pr eemptive action to 
ward off potential harm that might never occur. 
 
Accordingly, I would hold that the "last action which 
constituted a part of the breach" for statute of limitation 
purposes was the termination of the medical benefits that 
Unisys had assured the retirees they would receive for life, 
rather than any particular decisions the retir ees made on 
the strength of that assurance.6 
 
II. 
 
Even if our statute of limitations analysis wer e limited to 
fiduciary conduct by Unisys, the retir ees' claims still should 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
enforcement of the promise on which the participants relied, then it 
becomes clear that the injury that triggers the suit results from the 
fiduciary's failure to comply with the pr omise, rather than from the 
employee's decision to retire. Cf. Unisys II, 57 F.3d at 1269 (indicating 
that "an injunction ordering specific per formance of the assurances 
Unisys made" is an equitable remedy available under 29 U.S.C. 
S 1132(a)(3)). 
 
5. That question concerns the requir ement that we may only decide 
cases and controversies, and so turns on different policies from those 
underlying the statute of limitations. 
 
6. I disagree with the majority's statement that it is merely "fortuitous" 
that the fiduciary that misrepresented the permanency of the benefits is 
the same entity that ultimately cut off those benefits. To the contrary, 
it 
was the ability of Unisys to honor its promises that helped to induce the 
retirees' reliance and created a real prospect that they would not be 
injured. 
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not be barred on the present recor d, as there is evidence 
that Unisys continued to breach its duty by failing to 
correct the mistaken beliefs that its prior misstatements 
created. Because this continuing breach involved an 
omission rather than an act, the six-year limitations period 
would not commence until "the latest date on which the 
fiduciary could have cured the breach or violation". 29 
U.S.C. S 1113(1)(B). 
 
As the majority observes, we have previously r ecognized 
that a fiduciary has a "duty to deal fairly with its 
beneficiary and, more specifically, `to communicate to the 
beneficiary material facts affecting the interest of the 
beneficiary which he knows the beneficiary does not know 
and which the beneficiary needs to know for his 
protection.' " Supra at 21, quoting Bixler v. Central Pa. 
Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund , 12 F.3d 1292, 1300 (3d 
Cir. 1993).7 Here, the evidence suggests that Unisys 
breached this duty continuously from the time it first 
misrepresented the terms of the plan until the time the 
beneficiaries learned the material facts by receiving notice 
of the plan termination. Under the majority's holding, the 
beneficiaries' interests were not pr otected by the fiduciary's 
word, but could only be protected if they brought suit 
within six years. They therefore "needed to know for their 
protection" that the plan was not as it had been 
represented; and as the majority acknowledges in Part III of 
its opinion, there is evidence that Unisys knew that the 
employees were unaware of the material facts. 
 
Unisys therefore had an ongoing duty to inform the 
participants of the true state of affairs. As long as Unisys 
had reason to believe that the retir ees remained unaware of 
the material fact that the company retained a right to cut 
off their "lifetime" medical benefits, it was a violation of 
trust (i.e., a breach of fiduciary duty) every day for Unisys 
not to inform them.8 See Adams, 204 F.3d at 493-94 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Indeed, "[t]he duty to disclose material information is the core of a 
fiduciary's responsibility." Harte v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 214 F.3d 446, 
452 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Glaziers & Glassworkers Union Local No. 252 
Annuity Fund v. Newbridge Sec., Inc., 93 F .3d 1171, 1182 (3d Cir. 1996)). 
 
8. As the majority recognizes, "a duty to advise affirmatively of the 
reservation of rights clause might have arisen even in the absence of 
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("[B]ecause Unisys was aware that it r etained the right to 
modify, a knowing failure to clarify the material information 
about the retention of power was breach of its fiduciary 
duty."). 
 
Had Unisys told plaintiffs the truth, they could have 
acted to protect themselves. Cf. Harte v. Bethelehem Steel 
Corp., 214 F.3d 446, 448 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that where 
beneficiaries might predictably and r easonably rely on a 
misinterpretation of a plan provision,"a fiduciary may be 
held liable for failing to inform a beneficiary" of his rights 
"in a timely manner . . . (so that he might attempt to 
protect himself)."). Consequently, the participants and 
beneficiaries should be permitted to pr ove that they relied 
to their detriment on Unisys's continuing non-disclosure, 
by refraining from bringing the pr esent suit until after the 
omitted information was supplied. 
 
Recognition of an ongoing duty to correct prior 
misstatements entails that the statute of limitations does 
not run while a misstatement remains uncorr ected.9 
Conversely, the majority's holding that the statute runs 
from the date of retirement amounts to absolving the 
fiduciary from any ongoing duty to corr ect the 
misstatement. Today's holding is therefor e contrary to our 
decisions in Bixler and Harte. 
 
III. 
 
The most troubling aspect of the majority opinion is its 
treatment of the self-concealing wrong issue. As the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
beneficiary-specific information of confusion or mistake" where the 
fiduciary has "acquired knowledge of confusion so pervasive that a 
reasonable fiduciary would have done mor e than simply rely on its SPD." 
Supra at 22 (citing Unisys II, 57 F .3d at 1266). This duty is independent 
of the reasonableness of, or even the r easons for, the misapprehension. 
 
9. It might be objected that recognition of an ongoing duty would result 
in an open-ended statute of limitations. However , I believe that it is 
entirely consistent with public policy and the federal common law 
embodied in the "fraud or concealment exception" to hold that a 
fiduciary who has misled his beneficiary may never seek refuge behind 
the statute of limitations as long as he allows the deception to continue 
unabated. 
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majority observes, in Kurz v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 96 F.3d 
1544, 1552 (3d Cir. 1996) we "expr essly reserved the issue, 
elsewhere debated, of `whether S [1113]'s six year period 
extends to both "self-concealing" wrongs as well as "active 
concealment" separate from the underlying wr ongdoing.' " 
Supra at 10. Although the majority does not expr essly state 
whether its opinion is meant to address that issue, its 
requirement of "affirmative steps to conceal beyond the 
misrepresentations themselves" in or der to toll the statute, 
supra at 11 n.5, amounts to an outright r ejection of the 
self-concealing wrong doctrine. A requir ement of additional 
conduct beyond the breach itself is fundamentally at odds 
with the concept that a wrong may be self -concealing. 
 
I believe that the majority errs in interposing an 
additional requirement of an affir mative act of concealment 
on self-concealing wrongs. In so holding, it permits the 
ERISA statute of limitations to become an instrument to 
immunize fiduciary wrongdoing. 
 
The "fraud or concealment" provision incorporates the 
long-established principle of federal common law that a 
statute of limitations is tolled until discovery of the wrong 
where there is either underlying fraud or separate acts to 
conceal wrongdoing.10 As the Seventh Circuit has explained, 
 
       The reading we adopt . . . interprets the phrase "fraud 
       or concealment" in a way that gives both ter ms 
       meaning. An ERISA fiduciary can delay a wr onged 
       beneficiary's discovery of his claim either by 
       misrepresenting the significance of facts the beneficiary 
       is aware of (fraud) or by hiding facts so that the 
       beneficiary never becomes aware of them 
       (concealment). 
 
       . . . [T]his interpretation of "fraud or concealment" 
       harmonizes the phrase's meaning with the widely 
       known doctrine of fraudulent concealment, which tolls 
       the running of a statute of limitations when the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The effect of the majority's requirement of additional acts of 
concealment even in cases of self-concealing fraud is to allow tolling 
only 
in cases of concealment, and so to write the fraud alternative out of the 
statutory exception. 
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       defendant has prevented the plaintiff 's timely discovery 
       of the wrong she has suffered. 
 
Radiology Ctr., S.C. v. Stifel, Nicholas & Co., 919 F.2d 1216, 
1220 (7th Cir. 1990). See also Kurz v. Philadelphia Elec. 
Co., 96 F.3d 1544, 1552 (3d Cir. 1996) (observing that 
S 1113 "does not protect defendants in instances involving 
concealment or fraud") (quoting Gluck v. Unisys Corp., 960 
F.2d 1168, 1177 (3d Cir. 1992)) (emphasis added). 
 
The majority misinterprets our decision in Kurz as 
holding that even where concealing acts occur in the course 
of the underlying breach, "there must be conduct beyond 
the breach itself that has the effect of concealing the breach 
from its victims." Supra at 10. On the contrary, in Kurz, we 
expressly distinguished "self-concealing wr ongs" from 
" `active concealment' separate from underlying wrong". Id. 
at 1552 n.5.11 
 
This case is not like Kurz. There was no occasion to 
address the effect of a self-concealing wrong there, because 
there was no concealment. Indeed, we observed in Kurz 
that the employer's announcement of the amendment at 
issue just 35 days after the alleged misrepr esentation 
"exemplifie[d] the type of timely notification that companies 
should give their employees", and "for eclosed any 
suggestion that [the employer] attempted to conceal its 
plans or engaged in a campaign of fraud to pr event the 
plaintiff class from suing for the alleged breach". 96 F.3d at 
1552. In the present case, in contrast, the company's 
conduct was far from exemplary, as it engaged in a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. See also Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342, 349-50 (1874) (distinguishing 
between a fraud which "has been concealed" and one which "is of such 
character as to conceal itself "). Indeed, the majority opinion expressly 
acknowledges this distinction: "In this context,`a self-concealing act is 
an act committed during the course of the original fraud that has the 
effect of concealing the fraud from its victims, [while a]ctive 
concealment 
refers to acts intended to conceal the original fraud that are distinct 
from 
the original fraud.' Wolin v. Smith Bar ney, Inc., 83 F.3d 847, 852 (7th 
Cir. 1996)." Supra at 10. Nevertheless, it proceeds to conflate the two 
concepts by requiring acts distinct from the original breach even where 
concealment occurs in the course of the underlying breach. See supra at 
10-11. 
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"systematic campaign of confusion." In r e: Unisys Corp. 
Retiree Medical Benefit "ERISA" Litigation, 1994 WL 284079 
at 33 (E.D. Pa. June 24, 1994); see also In r e: Unisys Corp. 
Retiree Medical Benefit "ERISA" Litigation, 1996 WL 455968 
at *4-6 (discussing sufficiency of evidence of systematic 
misrepresentation and confusion in r einstating claims of 
Burroughs and Unisys plaintiffs). As discussed above, one 
effect of the resultant confusion was to mislead 
beneficiaries into believing they had no need or cause to sue.12 
Consequently here, unlike in Kurz, it is necessary to 
consider the effect of such self-concealing misconduct on 
ERISA's statute of limitations. 
 
The rationale underlying the self-concealing wr ong 
doctrine has long been recognized in our law: 
 
       To hold that . . . by committing a fraud in a manner 
       that it concealed itself until such time as the party 
       committing the fraud could plead the statute of 
       limitations to protect it, is to make the law which was 
       designed to prevent fraud the means by which it is 
       made successful and secure. 
 
Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342, 349 (1874). This principle 
that the law should not reward concealment is particularly 
applicable in the context of a fiduciary r elationship. See 
Amen v. Black, 234 F.2d 12, 26 (10th Cir . 1956) ("The law 
does not require one to suspect his fiduciary. Surely no one 
would contend that the . . . statute of limitations was 
intended to impose upon the defrauded party the bur den of 
discovering a fraud perpetrated by one standing in a 
position of trust.").13 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. See Barker v. American Mobile Power Corp. , 64 F.3d 1397, 1402 (9th 
Cir. 1995) (fraudulent concealment involves"affirmative conduct upon 
the part of the defendant which would, under the cir cumstances of the 
case, lead a reasonable person to believe that he did not have a claim for 
relief "). Cf. Lettrich v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 213 F.3d 765 (3d Cir. 
2000) 
(holding placement of amendment notice within technical document and 
failure to use more effective channels would support inference that 
employer intended to conceal amendment from af fected employees). 
 
13. Congress enacted ERISA to "pr otect . . . the interests of 
participants 
in employee benefit plans . . . by establishing standards of conduct, 
responsibility and obligation for fiduciaries." 29 U.S.C. S 1001(b). ERISA 
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If ever a case calls for application of the self-concealing 
wrong doctrine, this is such a case. Considering the facts in 
the light most favorable to the participants, as the party 
opposing summary judgment: Unisys purposely 
systematically misled its workers into believing that they 
had a legally protected right to medical benefits for life;14 it 
perpetuated the misinformation by repeating its 
misstatements to many employees over a period of years;15 
and it avoided any action that would have br ought the 
misrepresentation to the participants' attention, by paying 
the benefits until after the statutory period had passed. 
 
Thus, Unisys's conduct may be distinguished fr om a 
garden-variety fiduciary breach by two important factors: 
first, the beneficiaries were deceived, and remained so, to 
Unisys's knowledge, for several years, until shortly before 
suit was filed; and second, the deception was pr ocured by 
a systematic course of repeated misrepr esentations 
calculated to prevent the entire class of aggrieved retirees 
from learning the truth. I believe this amounts to a self- 
concealing wrong, sufficient to toll the statute without 
regard to "additional" conduct -- such as telling retirees 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
should therefore be applied to avoid r esults that "would afford less 
protection to employees and their beneficiaries than they enjoyed before 
ERISA was enacted." Heasley v. Belden & Blake Corp., 2 F.3d 1249, 
1257 (3d Cir. 1993). Enabling fiduciaries to secure immunity for their 
self-concealing misrepresentations by lapse of time would violate this 
principle. 
 
14. See Unisys II, 57 F.3d at 1266 (noting that the District Court "found 
that the company, both actively and affirmatively, systematically 
misinformed its employees about the duration of their benefits"). 
 
15. See Unisys II, 57 F.3d at 1265 ("Here the district court found that 
virtually the entire company management had consistently 
misrepresented the plan, not just on one occasion to one employee, but 
over a period of many years and both orally (in gr oup meetings) and in 
writing (in newsletters) as well."). I disagr ee with the majority's 
offhand 
remark that mere repetition of a misr epresentation cannot constitute 
concealment -- especially in the present context, where the 
misrepresentation was repeated to all and sundry, creating pervasive 
misunderstanding. It seems clear that consistent r epetition of a 
falsehood to all employees would well serve to pr event the truth from 
becoming known. 
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that the reservation of rights in the SPD did not apply to 
them -- which the majority properly finds sufficient to 
create a triable issue of concealment.16 
 
The majority gives great weight to Unisys's distribution of 
a Summary Plan Description with a reservation of rights 
clause. Any implication that there can be no concealment 
where an accurate SPD is provided is inconsistent with our 
cases holding that participants can be misled despite an 
accurate SPD, and that a fiduciary should not be permitted 
to prey upon the participants' foreseeable confusion.17 
Moreover, it is inconsistent with the majority's own 
recognition of evidence that, "despite the existence of the 
SPD", employees had "the mistaken belief that their health 
benefits were guaranteed for life." Supra at 21.18 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. I agree with the majority's conclusion that the company's advice that 
the reservation of rights clause "pertained to active employees and not to 
retirees" supra at 6, quotingIn re Unisys Corp., 1994 WL 284079 at*34, 
amounts to an affirmative step to conceal the effect of the clause at 
issue, and thus to conceal the retirees' potential injury. Cf. Adams, 204 
F.3d at 492 (finding participants likely to succeed on merits 
notwithstanding explicit reservation of rights where participants 
contended that, based on the employer's communications, they 
"reasonably believed that the active employees' booklets did not apply to 
them"). 
 
17. See, e.g., Adams, 204 F.3d at 492-93 ("[A] company cannot insulate 
itself from liability by including unequivocal statements retaining the 
right to terminate the plans at any time in the SPDs. . . . . 
[C]onflicting 
assertions cannot be ignored because they ar e not in the formal ERISA 
document."); Harte, 214 F.3d at 451 n.6 ("[T]he fiduciary duty to disclose 
and explain is not achieved solely by technical compliance with the 
statutory notice requirements."); Unisys II, 57 F.3d at 1264 
("[S]atisfaction . . . of . . . disclosur e obligations [through an SPD] . 
. . 
does not foreclose the possibility that the plan administrator may 
nonetheless breach its fiduciary duty . . . to communicate candidly, if 
the plan administrator simultaneously or subsequently makes material 
misrepresentations to those [to] whom the dut[ies] of loyalty and 
prudence are owed."). 
 
18. The majority holds that the SPD is but "one of the circumstances 
that must be considered" on the question offiduciary breach. Supra at 
22. The same must hold true for the role of the SPD on the question of 
concealment. 
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In sum, this case involves systematic conduct by Unisys 
that foreseeably led participants and beneficiaries to believe 
that they did not have a claim.19 That the concealing acts 
were woven into the fabric of Unisys's initial wrongdoing 
should be of no moment. Accordingly, I concur with the 
majority's holding that the plaintiffs have established at 
least a triable issue as to whether this is a case of "fraud 
or concealment", so that the statute of limitations would 
only begin to run upon discovery of the breach. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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19. As the majority concludes in Part III of its opinion, "there was 
evidence from which a trier of fact could conclude that Unisys should 
have foreseen that its conduct . . . would cause reasonable employees to 
rely to their detriment, despite the existence of the SPD." Supra at 20. 
By 
the same token, a factfinder could conclude that Unisys's conduct would 
cause those employees "to believe that [they] did not have a claim for 
relief " -- which is the essential characteristic of concealment. Barker, 
64 
F.3d at 1402. 
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